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ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL
PENALTIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY LEGISLATION©
By R.M. BROWN*
The sanction for occupational health and safety offences in Ontario is a
regulatory prosecution in provincial criminal court. In contrast, regulatory
officials assess administrative penalties in British Columbia and the United
States. A larger proportion of offenders are punished under these
administrative processes than in the Ontario criminal justice system, and the
average administrative penalty generally is higher than the average criminal
fine. In addition, a system of administrative penalties is better able to identify
employers who warrant punishment because regulators apply the civil standard
of proof, attach great weight to a firm's compliance history, and do not reserve
penalties for offences that actually result in a worker being harmed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Penalties are an important part of any regulatory regime and the
type of sanctioning mechanism utilized is likely to play a major role in
determining whether regulated firms comply with legal requirements.
This study compares regulatory prosecutions in Ontario with
administrative penalties in British Columbia and the United States as
mechanisms for promoting compliance with occupational health and
safety regulations
Since the inception of factory legislation in Canada during the
late nineteenth century, the sanction of choice for health and safety
offences has been prosecution in the provincial criminal courts. This
sanction continues to be the primary one in Ontario and in most other
Canadian jurisdictions. Prosecution is also the sanction typically used in
settings such as consumer safety and environmental regulation. A
prosecution for a regulatory offence is markedly different from a
proceeding under the Ciminal Code. However, for present purposes a
penalty levied by the courts under regulatory legislation is labelled as
criminal to distinguish it from a penalty imposed by an administrative
agency. The hallmark of a system of regulatory prosecution is that only
the courts have the power to levy penalties, although regulators typically
have the authority to issue compliance orders.
Under a pure system of administrative sanctions, regulatory
agencies levy monetary penalties. The courts are not involved, except in
rare cases of judicial review of agency action. The Workers'
Compensation Board in British Columbia and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration in the United States both assess monetary
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penalties. A parallel criminal process exists in each of these
jurisdictions, but criminal prosecutions are extremely rare compared
with administrative penalties. These two agencies are among the few in
Canada and the United States to make extensive use of administrative
penalties. 1
This purely administrative penalty should not be confused with a
distinctly different hybrid penalty, which is a cross between
administrative and criminal sanctions. These hybrid penalties are very
similar to the ticketing schemes widely utilized by the police for motor
vehicle offences. Under such a scheme regulators have the power to
assess a penalty, but if the penalty is contested, the matter is ultimately
adjudicated by a court rather than by a second administrative agency.
Hybrid penalties are addressed briefly in the concluding part of this
paper.
The second part of the paper contains a brief description of the
systems of administrative penalties utilized by the Workers'
Compensation Board and the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration. The factors considered in deciding both whether to levy
an administrative penalty and how large to set the penalty are described
along with the decision-making process at first instance and on appeal.
The third part presents a comparative evaluation of criminal and
administrative sanctions in the health and safety context. The primary
criteria for evaluating these two enforcement mechanisms are the
deterrent effect of penalties, as measured by the certainty and severity of
punishment, and the accurate selection of offenders who warrant
punishment. The cost of operating the criminal and administrative
processes is also considered, as is the speed with which cases are
decided. This analysis is based primarily upon data from British
1 The American scene is surveyed by Goldschmid and Diver. See: H. Goldschmid,
"Report in Support of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of

Civil Monetary Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies" (1972) 2
Recommendations and Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States 896; and C.

Diver, "The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative

Agencies" (1979) 8 Colum. L. R. 1435. The only Canadian regulatory agency known to make
extensive use of administrative penalties is the federal Department of Transport, which is

empowered to assess a penalty of up to a thousand dollars for certain aviation safety offences. If the
penalty is not paid, the matter is referred to the Civil Aviation Tribunal for adjudication.
Administrative penalties are more commonly used in the fields of taxation and social welfare. For

example, Revenue Canada levies penalties for income tax evasion and the Canadian Employment
and Immigration Commission does the same for fraudulent unemployment insurance claims.
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Columbia and the United States, where administrative penalties are
used, and from Ontario, where enforcement is more stringent than in
other provinces utilizing prosecution 2 The final part summarizes the
strengths and weaknesses of administrative and criminal penalties. It
briefly discusses hybrid penalties and concludes by recommending a dual
system in which administrative sanctions are commonly used but
criminal prosecution is retained for flagrant offenders.
II. SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
In British Columbia and the United States, the power to impose
penalties is shared by two regulatory bodies. The agency that
promulgates health and safety standards and whose officers conduct
inspections is empowered to propose penalties. When this front-line
agency decides that a penalty is warranted, the agency advises the
employer concerned that it is proposing a penalty of a specified amount.
The employer may contest the proposed penalty before a second agency
which is more or less independent of the first. This decision-making
structure has been labelled the "Split-Enforcement Model." 3 In both
jurisdictions, only employers can be penalized for contravening a
regulatory standard; supervisors and workers cannot.
A. Administrative Penaltiesin British Columbia
In British Columbia, the front-line agency empowered to
propose penalties is the Workers' Compensation Board. 4 Until recently,
disputed penalties were adjudicated by the Commissioners of the Board.
As the Commissioners bore ultimate responsibility for all of the Board's
operations, there was not an arm's length relationship between the
officers in the Board's Occupational Health and Safety Division who
proposed a penalty and the Commissioners who adjudicated it. The

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the data utilized were obtained by the author directly from

the enforcement agencies in these three jurisdictions and are not available from published sources.
3 G. Johnson, "The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions From the OSHA and
MSHA Experience" (1987) 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315.
4 Hereinafter wc.
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decision-making structure was altered in June 1991 to grant adjudicators
greater independence from field officers. Contested penalties (and
contested workers' compensation claims) are now adjudicated by the
The head of the
newly created Appeal Division of the wc3.
Occupational Health and Safety Division reports to the President of the
WCB, whereas both the President and the head of the Appeal Division
are appointed by and accountable to the wc's Board of Governors.
1. Criteria for imposing penalties
The Workers' CompensationAct5 empowers the Board to impose
penalties for violations of occupational health and safety regulations but
offers no guidance either as to when a penalty is to be imposed or as to
the amount of a penalty.6 The wcB policy manual directs its field officers
to consider recommending a penalty when an employer knowingly
exposes workers to a serious hazard or persistently fails to comply with
legal requirements. Officers also are directed to consider a penalty for
the occurrence of any of the eleven listed high risk violations.
The amount of a penalty is determined according to a schedule
adopted by the wcB in June 1986. The amount of a penalty varies with
the severity of the violation and the number of previous penalties, as well
as with the size of the employer's payroll. For this purpose, serious
violations are those involving a high risk of injury or disease or resulting
in a fatality or serious injury. In the case of first penalties for nonserious violations, the schedule calls for a fine ranging from $1,500 to
$4,000, depending upon a firm's payroll. First penalties for serious
violations range from $3,500 to $15,000. A second sanction for a more
serious violation within five years of the first, or a second sanction for a
less serious violation within three years of the first, results in a doubling
of the penalty.

5 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437.
6
bid., s. 73(1) as am. by S.B.C. 1985, c. 87, s. 2.
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2. Process for assessing penalties
The penalty process begins with a penalty recommendation
memorandum prepared by an officer from the Field Services
Department of the Board's Occupational Health and Safety Division.
If this recommendation is approved by the officer's regional
manager, it is forwarded to the Variance and Sanction Review Section of
the Research and Standards Department, which is located in the same
Division. A clerk in that section reviews the wcB's file on the employer
to verify the information contained in the penalty recommendation. The
clerk prepares a summary of the information in the employer's file and
forwards it along with the penalty recommendation to one of three
sanction review officers, all of whom have previous experience as field
officers.
If the sanction review officer believes that the material at hand
does not warrant a penalty, the officer so advises the regional manager.
In the event they cannot agree on how to proceed, final decision-making
authority resides with either the Director of Research and Standards or
the Director of Field Operations, depending upon which of them is
readily available. A review of all penalty recommendations made by
field officers in the first six months of 1985 found that 8.8 per cent were
rejected at this stage.
If the penalty recommendation is sustained, the sanction review
officer prepares what might be described as a show cause letter. This
letter advises the employer that the Board proposes to assess a penalty
unless the employer shows cause why this course should not be followed.
The employer is informed of the amount of the penalty usually levied in
similar circumstances. The letter closes by offering the employer an
opportunity to make representations in writing or at a meeting.
Of the approximately eight hundred employers who received a
show cause letter from the wcB in 1990, about one-half requested a
meeting. The rest submitted a written defence only. A meeting with the
employer is chaired by a sanction review officer-not necessarily the
same officer who prepared the show cause letter-and attended by the
field officer who initiated the penalty proceeding. The employer is
invited to present its cases and is allowed to produce witnesses. The
initiating officer responds to the employer's presentation and the
employer is permitted to reply to the officer. This exchange is
conducted informally. Witnesses are not sworn or formally examined
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and cross-examined. A clerk attends the meeting to take notes of what is
said. Written submissions follow a similar format. The employer's reply
to the show cause letter is sent to the regional manager and field officer
for comment and their comments are forwarded to the employer for
reply. Worker representatives are not notified of penalty proceedings or
invited to make submissions.
After considering the defence offered by the employer, the
sanction review officer prepares both a draft letter to the employer and a
memorandum summarizing the issues and recommending how to
proceed. These documents are forwarded to the Director of the
Research and Standards Department who decides whether to levy a
penalty.
In 1990 field officers recommended 862 penalties. Six hundred
and twenty-four (72.4 per cent) were confirmed by the Occupational
Health and Safety Division after the employers concerned were given an
opportunity to make representations. An employer rarely succeeds in
proving that a violation did not occur. Much more often an employer
avoids a penalty by demonstrating that it took all reasonable precautions
to prevent a violation or by convincing Board officials that a penalty is
not necessary to secure future compliance. When the Board is
persuaded by these arguments, the typical response is to withdraw the
penalty completely rather than to reduce the amount of the penalty.
3. Process for appealing penalties
A penalty imposed by the Occupational Health and Safety
Division may be contested before the Appeal Division. 7 Of the 624
penalties confirmed by the Occupational Health and Safety Division in
1990, 45.4 per cent were appealed. Some of these appeals were pending
at the time of writing. Of the 114 cases decided, 70.2 per cent of
penalties were confirmed, 8.7 per cent were reduced in amount, and 21.1
per cent were set aside entirely.
While employees cannot launch a penalty appeal, a worker
representative is invited to participate in an appeal initiated by an
employer. The Occupational Health and Safety Division is not a party
to appeal proceedings. All documentatiorn gathered by this Division in
7 Workers' CompensationAct, s. 96(1).
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the course of a penalty proceeding is forwarded to the Appeal Division,
including the field officer's penalty recommendation, all documents
prepared by the Variance and Sanction Review Section, and notes of any
meeting with the employer held by that Section. The Appeal Division
holds an oral hearing in approximately 25 per cent of all cases. Other
cases are adjudicated on the basis of written submissions and penalty
documents forwarded by the Occupational Health and Safety Division.
Most employers do not request an oral hearing. Hearing requests are
granted if there is a factual dispute that cannot be resolved without the
testimony of the inspecting officer or other witnesses.
During the 1980s, after employers had exhausted the informal
processes of the Occupational Health and Safety Division and the
formal processes of the Appeal Division, approximately 65 per cent of
the penalties initially proposed were confirmed.
The Appeal Division is the final trier of fact. While the Division
is not bound by policies adopted by the Occupational Health and Safety
Division, it is bound by policies established by the Board of Governors. 8
B. Administrative Penaltiesin the United States
In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 9 within the Department of Labor promulgates and
enforces legal standards. As part of its enforcement role, OSHA is
empowered to assess monetary penalties. A penalty levied by OSHA may
be contested before the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission 0, an independent administrative agency whose
commissioners are appointed by the President. This system of
administrative penalties operated by OSHA and OSHRC applies in

approximately one-half of the states of the union. The remaining states
have their own similar systems of administrative penalties.

8

Ibid.

9 Hereinafter OSHA.
10

Hereinafter osHmc.
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1. Criteria for imposing penalties
Some criteria for imposing penalties are found in the
OccupationalSafety and Health Act 11 and others are set out in osSA's
operations manual. The Act requires OSHA to assess a penalty for any
"serious" violation and gives the agency discretion to impose a penalty
for other types of violations. 12 A serious violation is defined as one,
which gives rise to a hazard that poses a "substantial risk of death or
serious physical harm" of which the employer "knew" or could have
known through the exercise of "reasonable diligence."1 3 OSHA'Spolicy is
to assess a penalty for all wilful and repeat violations as well as for all
violations which were previously cited and not abated, known as "failure
to abate violations."
As originally enacted by Congress in -1970, the Act fixed
maximum penalties at $10,000 for a wilful or repeat violation and $1,000
for other violations. Effective 1 March 1991, the maximum penalties for
all violations were raised sevenfold and a minimum penalty was
introduced for wilful violations. The current maximum penalty is
$70,000 for wilful or repeat violations and $7,000 for all other violations.
The new minimum penalty for wilful violations is $5,000.14 The Act
requires osHA to fix penalties "giving due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of
the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith
of the employer, and the history of previous violations."15
osHA's field operations manual contains extremely detailed
guidelines for calculating penalties. The first step in this calculation is to
determine a "gravity-based penalty," based on the probability and
severity of harm. This penalty ranges from a high of $5,000 for a
violation rated as "high" severity and "greater" probability to a low of
zero for a violation rated as "minimal" severity and "lesser" probability.
The gravity-based penalty may be adjusted downwards by reference to
mitigating factors, with a maximum possible reduction of 95 per cent (up
11 29 U.S.C. § 17(e) (1970).
12

Ibid., §§ 17(a) to (d).

13

Ibid., § 17(k).
Ibid., §§ 17(a) to (d).

14
15

Ibid., § 170).
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to 60 per cent for size of the employer's business; 25 per cent for good
faith; and 10 per cent for violation history).
OSHA generally combines two or more violations of the same
standard into one citation and assesses a single penalty. Since 1986, a
different approach has been taken in "egregious cases" whereby a
penalty is levied for each separate occurrence of a violation. This
approach requires the consent of the Assistant Secretary of Labor in
charge of OSHA. Even before the sevenfold increase in maximum
penalties, the resulting mega-fines in egregious cases ranged from $1.38
million to $7.3 million.16
2. Process for proposing penalties
As in British Columbia, the penalty process at OSHA begins with a
field officer recommending a penalty. The officer's recommendation is
reviewed by his or her supervisor and then forwarded to the area
director. If the area director accepts the recommendation, a citation is
issued setting out the penalty.
An employer faced with a proposed penalty may request to meet
with the area director in what is known as an informal settlement
conference. Worker representatives cannot initiate an informal
settlement conference to challenge a penalty. When such a conference
is held at the request of an employer, an employee representative is
entitled to attend unless the employer objects in which case a separate
conference is held with the employee representative.
The only data available on informal settlements are contained in
a 1984 report prepared by the General Accounting Office. 17 The
percentage of all violations addressed in informal settlement
proceedings was 10.6 per cent in fiscal year (FY) 1980-81, 14.0 per cent in
1981-82, and 15.0 per cent in 1982-83. As not all violations involve a
penalty, and the approximately 30 per cent of violations that were
penalized in these years were more likely to be the subject of a

16 W. Goldsmith, "Current Developments in Safety and Health" (1991) 16 Employee
Relations L. J. 543.

17 General Accounting Office, Informal Settlements of OSHA Citations: Comments on the
Legal Basis and Other Selected Issues (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1984) [hereinafter
General Accounting Office].
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settlement conference, the percentage of penalized violations subject to
settlement could be as high as 50 per cent.
The General Accounting Office examined in detail 946 violations
addressed in informal conferences in FY 1982-83. The vast majority of
these informal settlements resulted in a reduction in the amount of the
penalty assessed. Very rarely was a penalty withdrawn entirely. This
occurred in less than 4 per cent of violations subject to informal
settlements, which represents less than 0.6 per cent of all violations. In
FY 1982-83, proposed penalties totalling $4,064,214 were settled
informally and the total amount of these penalties was reduced by 56.4
per cent to $1,773,304. The corresponding percentages for 1981 and
1982 are 53.5 per cent and 58.9 per cent respectively. As the total
amount collected in penalties levied in 1983 was just over five million
dollars, over three million dollars must have been collected in penalties
that did not go through the informal settlement process.
3. Process for contesting penalties
An employer may contest an OSHA penalty before the
independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
While only an employer may commence OSHRC proceedings over a
penalty, a worker representative is entitled to participate. osHI's
regional solicitor also takes part.
OSHRC fulfills both mediation and adjudication functions. Since
1987, OSHRC has assigned each case to an administrative law judge (AU)
designated as a "settlement judge." A settlement negotiated at this stage
is known as a "formal settlement" and requires the consent of the
employer, any worker representative, and OSHA's Regional Solicitor.
When settlement proves impossible, OSHRc provides a two stage
adjudication process. First, a hearing is held before an ALT. Here OSHA
bears the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that a
violation occurred. Second, an aggrieved party may seek leave to have
an Au's decision reviewed by the Commissioners themselves. When the
Commissioners grant leave, they generally receive written submissions
and review the record of the ALJ proceeding, rather than conduct a
second oral hearing.
Over the last decade, the percentage of inspections with
violations for which notice of contest was filed with OSHRC has ranged
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from a low of 3.2 per cent in FY 1984-85 to a high of 10.9 per cent in
1981-82. The number of contests filed with OSHRC has ranged from a
high of 3,739 in 1980-81 to a low of 1,307 in 1984-85. In 1990-91, the
number of contests filed with osHRc was 3,350; 10.4 per cent of all
inspections with violations were contested. As most inspections with
violations result in a penalty, the contest rate for inspections with
penalized violations cannot exceed 20 per cent. In other words, the vast
majority of penalties are paid without formal contest.
Approximately 90 per cent of all cases in which a formal contest
is lodged with osHmc are settled or withdrawn prior to adjudication. In
FY 1990-91, 217 cases were decided by an AL and sixty-four such
decisions were referred to the Commissioners for review. Details are
not available as to the nature of settlements or the disposition of
adjudicated cases.
osHRc has the final say on questions of fact relating to the
occurrence of a violation. However, the Supreme Court recently ruled
that OSHRC must defer to osHA's interpretation of a legal standard so
18
long as that interpretation is reasonable.
III. COMPARING ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL
PENALTIES
How do the systems of administrative penalties found in British
Columbia and the United States compare to the criminal process utilized
in Ontario? In this part, the criminal and administrative processes are
compared with reference to their capacity to promote compliance with
regulatory requirements and to identify offenders who warrant
punishment. Also considered are operating costs and the speed with
which cases are decided.

18

Secrelaryof Labor v. OSHRC, ll1A S. Ct. 1171 (1991).
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A. Securing Compliance
A comparative evaluation of the ability of administrative and
criminal penalties to promote compliance with occupational health and
safety legislation must begin with some theory of a causal link between
punishment and conformity with legal requirements. The next section
sets out a theory of compliance and the following sections apply that
theory to criminal and administrative penalties.
1. Compliance theory
There is good reason to believe that penalties enhance
compliance in the short-term by threatening would-be offenders with
punishment, and in the long-term by changing attitudes about what is
morally acceptable behaviour.
Over the long-term, stigmatizing health and safety offenders by
subjecting them to legal punishment may generate a stronger moral
commitment to protecting the well-being of employees. The relative
ability of administrative and criminal sanctions to promote compliance
in this way depends entirely upon which produces the greater stigma.
Where conscience fails to induce obedience to law, the threat of
punishment may suffice. Deterrence theory posits that compliance is a
function of the probability of an offender being punished and the
severity of the penalty. In recent years, a number of studies have
attempted to determine whether individuals can be deterred from law
breaking. Most of these studies have examined the relationship between
self-reported juvenile delinquency or tax evasion, and perceptions of the
probability and severity of punishment. This research has produced little
evidence that the perceived severity of sanctions affects compliance but
substantial evidence that the perceived certainty of punishment does. A
number of these studies have distinguished between formal sanctions
and informal sanctions. Formal sanctions include incarceration or
monetary fines, imposed directly by the legal system, while informal
penalties are those indirectly caused by legal punishment, such as the
disapproval of family and peers and loss of social standing. Informal
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sanctions have been found to have a much stronger effect on an
individual's conformity to legal requirements than formal sanctions.19
Some commentators have argued that punishment is likely to be
a stronger deterrent for corporations than individuals because corporate
crimes are almost never spontaneous or emotional, but rather are an
exercise in calculated risk taking.20 However, there has been relatively
little empirical research on corporate deterrence. One study of the
enforcement of nursing home standards in Australia found no
association between compliance and the perceived severity and certainty
21
of formal punishment.
Several researchers have attempted to measure the impact of
OSHA's enforcement activities. The only study of the impact of OSHA
penalties on the extent of employer compliance with health and safety
regulations found a strong association between compliance and the
22
average penalty per inspection.
Other studies have examined the association between OSHA
penalties and injury rates rather than compliance rates. Any association
between penalties and injuries is certain not to be as strong as the
association between penalties and compliance because most injuries
cannot be prevented by complying with existing regulations. 23
Three studies of the impact of OSHA penalties on injuries used
data aggregated at the industry level for a period not long after OSHA was
established in 1970: 1972 to 1975 in one case, 1974 to 1978 in another,
and 1973 to 1983 in the third? 4 None of these three studies found a
19 For a summary of this literature, see J. Braithwaite & T. Makkai, "Testing an
Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence" (1991) 25 Law and Society Review 7.
20 j. Braithwaite & G. Geis, "On Theory and Action in Corporate Crime Control" (1982)
28 Crime and Delinquency 292.

21 Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 19.
22 A. Bartel & L Thomas, "Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at
OSHA's Impact" (1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
23 j. Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and PoliticalAnalysis of Occupational
Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1979); J. Mendeloff, "The Role of OSHA
Violations in Serious Workplace Accidents" (1984) 26 Journal of Occupational Medicine 353;
Bartel & Thomas, ibid.
24 Respectively, these studies are: W. Viscusi, "The Impact of Occupational Safety and
Health Regulation" (1979) 10 Bell Journal of Economics 117; Bartel & Thomas, ibid.; W. Viscusi,
"The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 1973-83" (1986) 17 Rand Journal of
Economics 567.
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statistically significant association between either the number of
penalties per employee, or the mean penalty amount in an industry, and
the injury rate for that industry.
Another study, using data from 1979 to 1985 for individual
employers, found that an employer's injury rate was inversely related to
both the probability of that employer being penalized and the mean
penalty for the employer's industry. 25 This study is more likely than the
earlier studies to measure osHI-'s true impact for two reasons. First, this
study used data for a later period when employers were more
accustomed to OSHA's enforcement activities. Second, while other
studies compared industries, this study compared individual employers,
avoiding the problems that arise from aggregating data on injuries and
penalties at the industry level. Rather than assuming that all employers
in an industry faced the same probability of a penalty, the researchers
developed a model to estimate the probability of each employer being
penalized based on that employer's size and injury record as well as on
the average number of penalties per employer in that industry. The
greater precision of this employer-level study lends credence to its
conclusion that penalties do prevent injuries.
The researchers conducting this study estimated that a 10 per
cent increase in the number of penalties would reduce the number of
injuries by 1.61 per cent and that a similar increase in the average size of
penalties would reduce injuries by 0.93 per cent. In other words, both
the severity and certainty of punishment strongly influence injury rates,
although certainty has a substantially stronger effect than severity. The
researchers also found that penalties prevent more injuries by altering
the conduct of employers who have not themselves been penalized than
by influencing the performance of penalized employers. In other words,
general deterrence is a more potent force than specific deterrence in
preventing injuries.
All these osHA studies focused exclusively upon formal sanctions.
As mentioned above, the informal sanctions flowing from legal
punishment were found to be a stronger deterrent than legal punishment
for individuals in the context of juvenile delinquency and tax evasion. Is
the same true for corporations and other organizational employers? A
25 J. Scholz & W. Gray, "A Behavioural Approach to Compliance: OSHA Enforcement's
Impact in Workplace Accidents" (Paper presented to the Law and Society Annual Meeting,
Denver, Colorado, June 1988) [unpublished].
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series of case studies of various allegations and prosecutions against
major corporations suggests the answer is yes. The loss of corporate
prestige and employee morale caused by adverse publicity, and the
distraction of senior managers from their normal duties while they
defended the corporation from public attack, were found to have a
larger impact on the corporate wrongdoer than large fines. 2 6 Two
studies of the enforcement of routine water pollution offences in Britain
concluded that adverse publicity was a more effective deterrent than
admittedly low criminal fines. Managers of regulated firms were
concerned that being labeled a troublemaker by one regulatory agency
would cause other agencies to follow suit.2 7
The next three sections assess the relative deterrent effect of
administrative and criminal penalties using data from British Columbia,
the United States, and Ontario, where enforcement is more stringent
than in other provinces utilizing criminal sanctions.
2. Certainty of punishment
The likelihood of a known offender facing an administrative
penalty in the United States is many times higher than the likelihood of
facing a prosecution in Ontario. The probability of an administrative
sanction in British Columbia is about twice as high as the probability of a
criminal proceeding in Ontario.2 8 These are the results of a comparison
of penalty frequency across jurisdictions taking into account the number
of inspections conducted and the number of violations recorded. The
data are broken down by fiscal year in a crude attempt to control for

26 B. Fisse & J. Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on CorporateOffenders (Albany:

State University of New York Press, 1984) at c. 20.
27

K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) at 147-149; Y.

Brittan, The Impact of Water Pollution Control Legislation on Industiy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 1984) at 84.
28 As this paper is about penalties, the focus is on the probability of known violations
resulting in a penalty, something the type of penalty utilized may influence. The probability of
violations being detected is ignored because it is not a function of penalty type. A comparison
across jurisdictions of the overall probability of violations being detected and penalized would have

to take into account the low probability of a workplace being inspected by OSHA and the higher
probability of a workplace being inspected in Ontario.

OccupationalHealth and Safety

1992]

macro-economic variables, which may effect the stringency of
enforcementP
In the United States, OSHA often assesses more than one penalty
against the same employer for violations detected on a single inspection,
whereas the practice in British Columbia and Ontario is to combine all
such violations into a single penalty proceeding or prosecution. For this
reason, comparing the number of OSHA penalties with the number of
proceedings elsewhere would make OSHA enforcement look more
stringent than it actually is. To avoid this problem, the penalty data
utilized for OSHA are the number of inspections with one or more
penalties rather than the total number of penalties. As wCB in British
Columbia and OSHA in the United States do not regulate the mining
industry, information for Ontario is presented only for the industrial and
construction sectors and not for the mining sector. As the agencies
studied in British Columbia and the United States can levy penalties
only against employers, and not against employees or supervisors, the
data presented for Ontario are for employers only. Data on employer
prosecutions in Ontario are not available for years preceding FY 198687.30

Table 1 reports the percentage of inspections resulting in penalty
action against an employer. The frequency of penalties decreased
during the recession of the early 1980s, but since then it has increased
more or less consistently. The percentage of inspections resulting in an
employer prosecution in Ontario is far lower than the percentage of
inspections resulting in an administrative penalty proceeding in British
Columbia or the United States. In Ontario, the percentage of
inspections which yielded a prosecution ranges between 0.4 per cent in
F' 1986-87 and 0.9 per cent in 1990-91. The percentage of British
Columbia inspections which led to penalty action during this period
29

The fiscal year in Ontario is April to March and in the United States is October to

September. As the fiscal year for British Columbia is the calendar year, the data presented
throughout this paper are for the years 1980 to 1990.

30 As an employer is one of the parties charged in almost all prosecutions by the
Industrial Health and Safety Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Labour, all prosecutions by this
Branch are treated as employer prosecutions. Construction Health and Safety Branch prosecutions
fall into two categories, tickets under Part I of the ProvincialOffences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33,

almost all of which involve only workers, and full-blown prosecutions under Part III of the Act
almost all of which involve an employer. Only the latter are included in the data presented here.
Although the Ontario legislation distinguishes between employers and constructors, constructors
are treated as employers for present purposes.
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ranges between 0.9 per cent to 1.8 per cent. The corresponding
percentages for OSHA are much higher with a low of 33 per cent and a
high of 63 per cent. In FY 1990-91, a prosecution followed 0.9 per cent of
all inspections by the Ontario Ministry of Labour, whereas an
administrative penalty was proposed for violations found in 1.8 per cent
of wcB inspections and in a whopping 63 per cent of OSHA inspections.

This cross-jurisdictional comparison offers a rough measure of the
relative certainty of punishment for known violations as long as the
violations detected on inspections do not differ substantially in number
or type from one jurisdiction to the next.
TABLE 1
Percentage of Inspections with Penalty
British Columbia

United States

1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84

0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2

27
21
22
24

1984-85

0.4

27

1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91

0.7
1.0
0.9
1.2
1.6
1.8

30
33
41
53
62
63

Year

Ontario

0.4
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9

While there is no ready way to control for the type of violations
cited, the number of orders issued to correct offences can be taken into
account. As reported in Table 2, the number of violations per inspection
is consistently lower in Ontario than in the other two jurisdictions.
While these numbers could reflect a real difference in the average state
of compliance at inspected sites, they are just as likely to be a product of
different administrative practices in recording violations. Even if these
numbers do reflect real differences in violation rates, any such
differences are smaller than the differences in the percentage of
inspections resulting in penalty action. OSHA has approximately sixty
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times as many penalties per inspection as Ontario but only three times as
many recorded violations. wcB records one and a half times as many
violations per inspection but has twice as many penalties.
TABLE 2
Average Number of Violations Per Inspection
Ontario

British Columbia

United States

1980-81
1981-82

0.8
0.8

1.4
1.6

2.0
1.6

1982-83
1983-84

0.8
0.7

1.6
1.2

1.6
1.6

1984-85
1985-86

0.8
0.8

1.1
1.2

1.7
2.0

1986-87

0.8

1.2

2.2

1987-88
1988-89

0.9
1.1

1.4
1.4

2.7
3.4

1989-90
1990-91

1.1
1.0

1.5
1.7

3.8
3.6

Year

Some proposed administrative penalties are later withdrawn.
Similarly, some prosecutions result in an acquittal. In recent years,
approximately 80 per cent of the cases prosecuted in Ontario have
resulted in a conviction. As noted above, approximately 65 per cent of
the WCB penalties initially proposed during the 1980s were confirmed.
Penalties proposed by osHA are rarely withdrawn entirely as a result of
informal settlement conferences. And less than 20 per cent of osHA
inspections with penalties are contested before OSHRC. While data are
not available on the disposition of these appeals, no doubt some
penalties are withdrawn or overturned at this stage. These figures
demonstrate that the frequency of confirmed administrative penalties in
British Columbia and the United States is higher than the frequency of
convictions in Ontario.
The question remains whether the observed difference in the
frequency of penalties is a function of the type of sanctioning mechanism
utilized. Political factors offer another possible explanation. An activist
government can dramatically increase the stringency of regulatory
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enforcement just as a government with a free-market bent can have the
opposite effect, whatever the sanctioning mechanism. However, politics
cannot explain the higher frequency of penalties in British Columbia and
the United States. The lower probability of punishment in Ontario
persisted unabated throughout the late 1980s when that province was
governed by the Liberals and both of the other jurisdictions had more
conservative governments. A more convincing explanation for the
observed differences in the probability of punishment is the type of
sanction utilized. The reasons why penalty frequency is higher in the
administrative process are discussed at the end of this section.
The greater probability of punishment for known violations
under a system of administrative penalties is very important because
deterrence research strongly suggests that more certain punishment
leads to greater compliance.
3. Severity of punishment
The severity of punishment also may have a bearing on
compliance, although there is less empirical evidence of any causal
relationship. One measure of the severity of sanctions for health and
safety offences is the size of monetary penalties. The data presented
below reveal that, in recent years, the average court fine in Ontario has
been substantially larger than the average OSHA penalty in the United
States. Both jurisdictions sharply increased maximum fines during the
1990s, but it appears likely that Ontario fines will continue to be higher.
However, Ontario's advantage in penalty severity is more than offset by
the far greater certainty of punishment in the United States. Total
penalties in the United States-the product of the probability and
severity of punishment-are many times higher than in Ontario. Prior to
the 1990 enactment of Bill 208,3 1 which dramatically increased the
maximum corporate fine in Ontario, average penalties in Ontario and
British Columbia were not significantly different. Since the passage of
Bill 208, average fines in Ontario have leapt ahead of those in British
Columbia. As a result, total penalties in Ontario are likely to exceed

31 An Act to Amend the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Workers'
CompensationAct, 2nd Sess., 34th Leg., Ontario, 1989.
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those in British Columbia in the future unless the WCB increases
maximum penalties in step with other jurisdictions.
In the following analysis, the measure of penalty severity is the
aggregate fine assessed against an employer for all violations detected
on a single inspection 3 2 Unlike court fines in Ontario and
administrative penalties in British Columbia, penalties initially levied by
osriA are frequently reduced as a result of settlements. For this reason, a
distinction must be made between penalties initially assessed by osHA
and final penalties.
TABLE 3
Average Penalty
Year
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91

Ontario

1,800
2,600
2,400
2,600
3,200
3,712
5,667
5,626

British Columbia
8,378
3,984
4,404
3,123
1,911
2,368
3,254
4,914
4,036
5,223
5,679

United States
449
341
333
353
399
505
848
1,146
1,509
2,212
3,471

Table 3 records the average size of monetary penalties in the
three jurisdictions. Like the frequency of penalties, the average penalty
decreased during the recession of the early 1980s, but it has increased
more or less consistently since then. osHA periodically updates its
penalty figures to reflect reductions in the amount of penalties that
occur through settlement or adjudication. This updated data was used
to construct Table 3. For FY 1980-81 through FY 1989-90, this table
reports the average of osHA penalties extant as of 12 May 1991 and

32 Data on employer penalties in Ontario are not available for years preceding FY 1983-
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incorporates any reductions made before that date. For inspections
conducted in FY 1988-89 or earlier, it is safe to assume, in almost all
cases, that informal settlement procedures and OSHRC proceedings were
waived or exhausted before 12 May 1991 so that the figures reported
here accurately reflect the average amount of final penalties. For
inspections conducted in OSHA'S 1990-91 fiscal year, which ended on 30
September 1991, the data reported in Table 3 are for penalties extant as
of 18 November 1991. Ultimately, a significant number of these
penalties will be substantially reduced. 33
The data permit a reliable comparison of final penalties in the
United States and Ontario for years up to and including F, 1988-89. For
each of these years, the average OSHA penalty is much smaller than the
average court fine in Ontario. However, the gap has narrowed
considerably in recent years. In Fi' 1984-85, the average Ontario fine
was 6.5 times larger than the average OSHA final penalty, but by 1988-89
it was only 2.5 times larger. For five of eight years, the only period for
which comparable data are available, the average Ontario fine was
smaller than the average administrative penalty in British Columbia,
although in recent years the difference was very small.
While Ontario leads the United States by a large margin in the
average amount of final penalties, this may not be the best measure of
sanction severity in an analysis of deterrence. To the extent that the
severity of sanctions is a deterrent, what matters is that the severity
perceived by employers and perceptions may differ from reality.
Employers' perceptions may be influenced by OSHA's initial penalties
even if those penalties are later reduced in the settlement process. This
is particularly so if large initial penalties generate more publicity than
smaller, final penalties. .If perceptions operate in this way, Ontario's
advantage in sanction severity is not as large as the data on final
penalties suggest.

33 The average penalty per inspection was computed from the only data which could be
obtained from OSHA. The adjusted amount of penalties was divided by the number of inspections

with initial penalties. Accordingly, the amount of penalties reflects any reduction that occurred
after initial assessment, whereas the number of penalties does not. For this reason, the average

penalty per inspection reported here is slightly lower than the true adjusted figure.
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TABLE 4
Distribution of Penalties

Penalty
1 to 499
500 to 999
1,000 to 2,499
2,500 to 4,999
5,000 to 9,999
10,000 to 19,999
20,000 to 49,999
50,000 to 99,999
100,000 to 499,999
500,000 to 999,999
1,000,000 or more

Ontario
(1989-90)

British Columbia
(1990)

3
5
23
25
32
22
5

0
83
183
61
26
4

United States
(1989-90)
10,172
6,222
7,231
2,872
1,080
508
218
35
12
7
4

Table 4 provides a breakdown of the amount of penalties in the
three jurisdictions for the last complete year for which data are available.
One notable difference is that a large proportion of OSHA penalties are
under $500 whereas penalties of this size are relatively rare in Ontario.
At the other end of the scale, the largest penalties levied by OSHA far
exceed those in Ontario. In FY 1989-90, there were no fines over $25,000
in Ontario. That year OSHA levied twenty-three penalties in excess of
$100,000, eleven in excess of $500,000, and four in excess of $1,000,000.
(In 1990-91, OSHA levied forty-seven fines over $100,000, fifteen over
$500,000, and eight over $1,000,000.) As the osHA data are for penalties
initially assessed, final penalties will be lower, with many penalties
reduced by an average of about 50 per cent through settlements and
appeals. Even after the settlement and appeal processes are exhausted,
a substantial number of very large penalties will remain. Although most
OSHA penalties are small, the relatively few, huge penalties may have a
substantial deterrent value if they attract more publicity, and therefore,
have a greater impact on employer perceptions than do the smaller ones.
There remains to be considered the very recent increase in
legislatively prescribed maximum penalties in both Ontario and the
United States, which the preceding analysis largely ignores. Ontario's
Bill 208 increased the maximum penalty for a corporation to $500,000
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from $25,000 effective 15 August 1990. 4 Table 5 presents a comparison
of fines before and after Bill 208. The "after" period includes all cases
decided prior to 18 March 1992. Since Bill 208, there have been fewer
fines under $1,000. There were no cases with total fines in excess of
$25,000 in FY 1989-90, but there have been seventeen such cases after
Bill 208. Indeed, there have been four fines in excess of $100,000, with
the two largest fines to date being $300,000 and $400,000. The average
fine after Bill 208 is $33,504, about six times the previous average.
TABLE 5
Ontario Penalties Before and After Bill 208
Before Bill 208
(1989-90)

Penalty

After Bill 208
(after15 August 1990)

3

1 to 499

5

1

1,000 to 2,499

23

5

2,500 to 4,999

25

5

32
22
5

13
13
9
6
2
2

500 to 999

5,000 to 9,999
10,000 to 19,999
20,000 to 49,999
50,000 to 99,999
100,000 to 249,999
250,000 or more

The maximum fines found in the OccupationalSafety and Health

Act were increased sevenfold by Congress effective 1 March 1991. 35 This
legislative change is directly reflected in the formula for calculating
penalties set out in OSHA's operations manual. Currently gravity-based
penalties range from $1,000 to $5,000 per violation, whereas previously
they ranged from $100 to $1,000. In other words, the minimum gravitybased penalty grew tenfold and the maximum fivefold. In short, the size

34 As the new corporate maximum fine applies to offences committed after 15 August

1990, the data in Tables 3 and 6 for FY 1990-91 offences partially reflect the new maximum fines.
35

As OSHA's 1990-91 fiscal year ended in September 1991, the data in Tables 3 and 6 on

average penalties in that fiscal year partially reflect the new minimum and maximum penalties.
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of penalties has grown at least as much in the United States as in
Ontario. The average penalty in British Columbia is predicted to fall
behind that in Ontario unless WCB revises its penalty schedule to keep
pace with the new statutory maximum penalties in Ontario.
TABLE 6
Total Penalties
(Thousands of dollars)
Year
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91

Ontario

451,800
418,600
379,200
548,600
860,800
1,247,232
2,204,463
2,149,132

British Columbia
603,223
223,109
264,244
177,999
212,098
589,735
1,343,500
1,631,500
2,086,750
3,379,000
4,895,080

United States
7,167,108
4,417,884
5,003,897
6,057,556
7,620,781
9,852,789
17,028,109
27,219,472
43,804,886
62,720,886
91,676,337

To this point in the analysis, the size of monetary penalties has
been treated separately from the certainty of known violations being
punished. But deterrence is as much, if not more, a function of certainty
as of severity. The total dollar value of all penalties, the product of the
average monetary penalty and the number of penalties, is reported in
Table 6. As complete data on final penalties are not available for British
Columbia, the figures reported are for penalties initiated not those
finalized. As noted above, approximately 65 per cent of all penalties
proposed by WCB are confirmed and rarely is the confirmed penalty
smaller than the one initially proposed. On the assumption that final
penalties do not differ in size from those set aside, the total amount of
penalties confirmed would be about 65 per cent of the amount reported
in Table 6.
The total amount of osHA final penalties is consistently much
higher than the total amount of fines in Ontario and the differential has
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increased with time. OSHA penalties in aggregate are thirteen times
greater than total fines in Ontario for FY 1983-84 and thirty-five times
larger for 1988-89, the last year for which reliable data on OSHA final
penalties are available. When the total amount of proposed penalties in
British Columbia is discounted by 35 per cent to estimate final penalties,
the resulting figure is greater than the total amount of fines in Ontario in
five of the eight years for which data are available. While the Ontario
Ministry of Labour conducts more inspections each year than its
counterparts elsewhere, total penalties in Ontario are less.
TABLE 7
Total Penalties Per Inspection
Year
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91

Ontario

4.5
4.4
4.3
7.3
13.4
16.6
33.4
39.2

BritishColumbia
17.7
5.8
6.5
3.9
4.9
11.3
22.2
28.1
31.6
55.6
65.6

United States
126.7
71.6
73.9
84.5
106.2
153.1
276.7
473.3
805.5
1380.1
2177.8

A more precise comparison of the combined certainty and
severity of punishment can be accomplished by dividing the total penalty
dollars by the total number of inspections. The results are reported in
Table 7 with the dollar amount of penalties proposed in British
Columbia discounted by 35 per cent to estimate final penalties. The
ratio of penalty dollars to total inspections is higher in British Columbia
than in Ontario for six of the eight years for which data are
available-from about 200 per cent higher in FY 1985-86 decreasing to
70 per cent higher in 1990-91. These figures do not take into account
the very recent increase in Ontario fines brought about by Bill 208 and
not matched in British Columbia. The ratio of total final penalties to
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total inspections is nineteen times higher in the United States than in
Ontario for FY 1983-84 and it increased to forty-nine times higher by
1988-89. For FY 1988-89, the amount collected per inspection by OSHA is
$805.54 and by vcB is $31.56, as compared with $16.63 levied by the
Ontario courts. Even though osHA records close to 300 per cent more
violations per inspection than does the Ontario Ministry of Labour, and
wcB records 50 per cent more than the Ministry, these differences can
explain such disparities in the total amount of penalties per inspection.
In summary, the probability of an employer being penalized after
an inspection is roughly twice as high in British Columbia as in Ontario.
Until recently, the average employer penalty was slightly higher in
British Columbia in most years, but Bill 208 almost certainly will propel
Ontario into the lead. While the ratio of total penalty dollars to total
inspections was substantially higher in British Columbia before Bill 208,
Ontario is now likely to move ahead on this front also. Although the
future is uncertain, British Columbia easily could follow the lead
elsewhere by dramatically increasing the size of penalties. If the average
penalty in British Columbia was brought into line with the Ontario scale,
more frequent wcB penalties again would provide a greater financial
disincentive than Ministry of Labour prosecutions. The high cost of
prosecution, discussed in detail below, is a major impediment to any
substantial increase in the number of criminal penalties in Ontario.
The probability of an inspection yielding a penalty is more than
sixty times higher in the United States than in Ontario, while the average
penalty is now twice as high in Ontario. OSHA administrative penalties
offer a greater financial deterrent to known offenders than do criminal
penalties in Ontario for two reasons. First, the total amount of penalties
is far greater in the United States, even when adjusted to account for the
number of inspections and recorded violations. Second, deterrence
research suggests the certainty of punishment has a greater bearing on
compliance than does the severity of punishment.
For present purposes, Ontario provides an instructive example of
the criminal process in action. The amount of fines per inspection is
substantially higher in Ontario than in Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, the only provinces for
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which comparable information is available.3 6 Even though Ontario is
the enforcement leader among prosecuting provinces, fines in Ontario
have provided much less financial deterrence than administrative
penalties in British Columbia and the United States.
4. Stigma of punishment
Potential offenders may be deterred more by informal sanctions,
such as loss of personal and corporate prestige, which are triggered by
the legal system, than by formal legal sanctions. If the stigma of being
sanctioned promotes compliance, then it becomes important to
understand how the stigma of punishment can be enhanced. Two factors
that may determine the degree of stigma are the moral judgment of
those who know that punishment has been imposed, and the number of
people with this knowledge, particularly people whose opinion matters
to the offender.

While a jail sentence is probably seen by most people as
indicating greater moral turpitude than a monetary penalty, a prison
sentence is very rare in the sphere of regulatory offences. A fine
imposed by a criminal court for a health and safety offence may be
perceived by most people as indicating greater wrongdoing than an
administrative penalty, although there is little empirical evidence on this
point 3 7 This perception may exist because judicial pronouncements are
36

For example, in 1986-87 the percentage of inspections resulting in a penalty was higher
in Ontario (0.4) than in Manitoba (0.3), Saskatchewan (0.2), Newfoundland (0.1), or New
Brunswick (0). While the percentage of inspections with penalty was higher in Alberta (0.5) than in
Ontario, the average fine in Ontario was four times as large as in Alberta (and at least three times
as large as in the other provinces listed). As the frequency and size of penalties in Ontario has more
than doubled since 1986-87, it is highly unlikely that Ontario has lost the lead it held then.
37 Some data on the way people perceive criminal and administrative penalties are
offered by a survey of taxpayers who were asked about the impact on their reputation of "being
penalized for negligently under-reporting taxable income to Revenue Canada" and "being found
guilty in court of tax evasion". While forty-five per cent rated the impact of a guilty verdict on their
reputation as either substantial or extreme, only sixteen percent felt the same way about a penalty.
See N. Brooks & A. Doob, "Tax Evasion: Searching for a Theory of Compliant Behaviour," in M.
Friedland, ed., Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990). The answers may have been coloured by a suggestion in the question that the offence being
penalized by Revenue Canada (negligently under-reporting) is less serious than the one considered
by the court (tax evasion). Moreover, the question refers to a finding of guilt by the court but
mentions no corresponding finding by Revenue Canada.
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seen as more authoritative than are administrative rulings, or because
the judiciary is associated with more serious crimes than are health and
safety administrators. Even if such a perception does exist where all
other things are equal, other things may differ. osHA sometimes imposes
fines in excess of $500,000 or even $1,000,000, something the Ontario
courts have never done. It is possible that perceptions of moral
turpitude are influenced by such huge penalties.
Left to its own devices, the media may be more likely to publicize
criminal penalties than administrative sanctions because prosecutions
are acted out in open court, whereas many administrative proceedings
are conducted through correspondence or behind closed doors.
However, regulators and administrators may be able to compensate for
the inattentiveness of the media by issuing press releases or by
publishing their own newsletters.
In the absence of solid empirical evidence, one can only
speculate about the relative stigma of different enforcement
mechanisms. While it is possible that criminal penalties carry greater
stigma, the administrative approach almost certainly has the potential to
produce more penalties of greater total value.
B. Deciding Who to Punish
The potential of the administrative process to generate more
penalties than the criminal process is .to be applauded only if those
receiving administrative sanctions deserve them. There is good reason
to believe that the administrative procedures utilized in British
Columbia and the United States more accurately identify offenders who
warrant punishment than does the court system in Ontario.
1. Determining fault
Fault is an important criterion in selecting offenders for
punishment whatever the sanction. Not every employer who commits a
health and safety offence is penalized. While the violation of a legal
standard typically results in an order to rectify the resulting hazard, the
vast majority of offenders in Ontario and British Columbia are not
punished. The same is true of a large minority of offenders in the
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United States. A penalty is more likely to result from a violation if the
employer was not duly diligent in attempting to ensure compliance.
Reserving penalties for employers who are at fault makes good sense.
Employers who take all reasonable precautions to ensure that regulatory
standards are met do not deserve to be punished when their efforts fail.
Moreover, punishing employers who take all reasonable precautions
would do little to enhance future compliance. The administrative
process is better suited to determining whether reasonable steps were
taken to comply with regulatory requirements because this process takes
into account an employer's history of previous violations.
If the resources of inspectors and adjudicators were unlimited,
the ideal way to determine whether an employer exercised due diligence
would be to investigate thoroughly not only the immediate
circumstances of the offence, but also the employer's prevention
programme which gave rise to those circumstances. This investigation
would delve into the actions of all those involved at the time the
violation occurred and probe the adequacy of aspects of the employer's
health and safety programme such as its physical plant, maintenance
procedures, inspection routines, training, and supervision.
Unfortunately, if this sort of far-reaching inquiry is required whenever
penalty action is considered, resource constraints dictate that few
offenders would be penalized.
In many cases, a more practical way to determine whether all
reasonable steps were taken to prevent a particular type of infraction is
to review the employer's record of previous occurrences of the same type
of violation. When numerous occurrences of the same violation have
been cited over the course of several inspections, there is good reason to
conclude that the employer's prevention programme is inadequate. A
single violation may be nothing more than an aberration in the
performance of a prevention programme that generally ensures
compliance. But repeated infractions leave little doubt that the
programme is deficient.
In the administrative process utilized in British Columbia and
the United States, an employer's compliance history is weighed in
determining whether to take penalty action. While the governing
legislation leaves the enforcement agency to decide whether to penalize
* repeat violations, the published policy of both agencies recognizes that
an employer's compliance history is an important factor in penalty
decisions. osSA's policy is to penalize an employer who is cited for a
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repeat violation, which is defined as an offence that is "substantially
similar" to one previously cited. wcB's manual directs officers to
consider a penalty when faced with persistent non-compliance.
Empirical investigation confirms that wcB officials do take past offences
into account when making penalty decisions. A questionnaire was sent
to all Board officers and 63 per cent of them replied. Using a sevenpoint scale, respondents rated the importance of several factors in
deciding whether to recommend a penalty for a particular infraction. As
reported in Table 8, previous occurrences of the same violation received
the highest mean score (6.5). A lower score was assigned to the other
possible indicator of fault, the effort made to prevent a violation (5.8).
The significance of compliance history to both field officers and
those who review their penalty recommendations is confirmed by a
review of all documentation in the files relating to 230 penalties
proceedings for offences occurring between January 1984 and June 1985.
In most of these files, the only recorded basis for a finding of fault is a
history of previous occurrences of the same type of infraction which
prompted the penalty recommendation. The case of a tire repair shop
penalized for violations involving the handling of split rims is illustrative.
This offence had been cited previously and had resulted in two serious
injuries as well as a fatality, over a period of six years. "We don't have
the time or money for safety" was the way the officer concerned
characterized the outlook of the firm's senior management. 38

38 While WCB officials attach great weight to previous violations of a particular
regulation when that regulation is violated again, much less weight is attached to past occurrences of
other types of offences. Previous occurrences of other types of violations received one of the lowest
mean scores (4.3) of any of the factors officers were asked to rate. Many officers apparently divide
an employer's compliance history into almost watertight compartments, one for each type of
offence. This approach is also evident from a review of penalty files. When recommending a
penalty, officers often mention past instances of the type of violation that precipitated the

recommendation for sanction, but they seldom refer to other types of infraction. Perhaps officers
follow this approach because reviewing a firm's history of previous violations of all types would be a

burdensome task.
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TABLE 8
Factors Influencing Penalty Decisions in British Columbia
Factor

Any previous violations of the
same regulation now being violated
Previous warning letter
Previous penalty
The particular regulation(s) violated
Probability that injury or disease
could have resulted from violation

Mean Score

6.5
6.5
6.2
6.0

Severity of injury or disease which
could have resulted from violation

5.8

The degree of effort made before the inspection
to comply with the regulations

5.8

The actualoccurrence of serious injury or disease

5.5

The degree of willingness expressed during or after
the inspection to comply with the regulations
Number of violations discovered during the inspection
Any previous violations of otherregulations
The size of the employer's business
Your assessment of the employer's ability

4.7
4.4
4.3
1.9

to pay a penalty

1.8

In short, administrative penalty decisions made by both osHIA and
wcB take into account an employer's compliance record. This is not to
suggest that penalties are never imposed when there is no history of past
offences. In the absence of such a history, other evidence relating to the
immediate circumstances of a violation or to the employer's prevention
programme may be found to demonstrate a lack of due diligence and to
warrant a penalty. However, the vast majority of penalties are based
upon a history of non-compliance.
When the sanctioning mechanism is prosecution rather than
administrative penalties, health and safety officials are likely to take
compliance history into account in deciding whom to prosecute simply
because they have an ongoing relationship with regulated firms. This is
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the approach to prosecution followed by the British Factory
Inspectorate.3 9 No doubt regulatory officials in Ontario do the same. In
the criminal process, however, the courts are charged with determining
guilt and they ignore previous violations in making this determination.
The rules of evidence applied in criminal proceedings prevent the
prosecutor from tendering the employer's compliance record to prove a
lack of reasonable care. While previous convictions are considered in
fixing sentence, the accused's record of previous infractions is
disregarded in deciding whether to convict or acquit, and the same is
true of earlier offences that did not result in a prosecution.
With such evidence excluded, a judge's picture of the accused is
both very different and less accurate than the one seen by the inspector
concerned. An employer known by the inspector to be a habitual
offender, with a grossly deficient compliance programme, appears to the
court as an employer who has committed a single offence and who may
have done so despite taking reasonable precautions. A similar
difference of perspective between regulators and judges has been noted
in the context of environmental offences in Britain.4° When past
offences are not admitted in evidence, a judge must rely instead upon
other evidence in applying the test of due diligence. A judge who
focuses exclusively upon the immediate circumstances of the offence
may conclude that those present did all that was reasonable in the
circumstances to ensure compliance. The problem with this approach is
that these circumstances may themselves be the product of an
inadequate prevention programme. A different problem is encountered
if the focus shifts to the adequacy of the employer's prevention
programme. Delving into all the details of this programme requires
more time than crowded court dockets permit and calls for more health
and safety expertise than many judges possess. Reviewing an employer's
record of previous occurrences of the same infraction is a much better
way to determine whether reasonable steps were taken to prevent a
violation from occurring.

39 W. Carson, "Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of
Factory Legislation" (1970) 30 Modem Law Review 396; Law Commission, Codification of the
Criminal Law: Strict Liability and the Enforcement of the FactoriesAct (London: Law Commission,

1971).
40 Hawkins, supra note 27 at 189.
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Yet judges are unlikely to embrace this approach for health and
safety offences because it is so dramatically different from the way they
deal with conventional crimes, which make up the bulk of their work.
The judiciary pays little heed to major differences between regulatory
offences and more conventional crimes like theft or assault. The rule of
evidence that precludes the prosecution from relying upon previous
offences to secure a conviction makes good sense for conventional
crimes. In this context, the commission of the offence or the identity of
the offender is usually in dispute. Sometimes both are at issue. Jumping
from the premise that someone committed a particular criminal act on a
previous occasion to the conclusion that that person did the same thing
again entails too great a risk of convicting and perhaps incarcerating an
entirely innocent person.
The regulatory setting is very different in two senses. When the
defence of due diligence is raised, the violation of a legal standard by the
accused has already been established. Moreover, the liberty of the
accused is almost never at risk in occupational health and safety cases.
Although the criminal courts are empowered to impose a prison
sentence, they almost never do and cannot where the accused is a
corporation. Under a system of administrative penalties, imprisonment
is never possible. When the violation of a legal standard is proven or
admitted, and all that is in dispute is the effort made to comply, an
employer's record of recent occurrences of the same type of violation
offers a reliable basis for deciding whether to impose a monetary
penalty.
2. Punishing risk versus harm
Most of the health and safety infractions detected by inspectors
are discovered before someone is actually harmed. There is a strong
argument that offenders should be penalized for creating risk, not just
for causing, harm because the objective of health and safety standards is
to compel employers to take precautions, which reduce the risk of injury
and disease. If a particular violation gives rise to a chance of serious
injury, mere luck determines which of the employers who commit this
offence will injure a worker. The fortunate employer whose offence
hurts no one is as much in need of deterrence as the unfortunate one
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whose employee is maimed. 41 The available evidence strongly suggests
that the administrative process is more likely than the criminal justice
system to punish offenders whose transgressions create risk but cause no
actual harm.
In British Columbia, 80 per cent of the administrative penalties
recommended during the first six months of 1985 for safety violations
were prompted not by an injury or fatality, but by the risk of such
harm. 42 In answering the questionnaire, wcB officers reported that their
decisions about penalties are more strongly influenced by the potential
for harm (mean of 6 for probability and 5.8 for severity) than by its
actual occurrence (mean of 5.5) as reported in Table 8. Risk also plays a
major role in osHA's penalty decisions. The vast majority of the tens of
thousands of administrative penalties imposed annually by OSHA are in
cases where no one has been hurt.
Where health and safety offenders are punished under the
criminal justice system, a smaller percentage of sanctions are for
offences that do not result in a worker being injured or killed. The only
Ontario data available are for cases referred to the Ministry of Labour's
Legal Branch by health and safety officials with a recommendation for
prosecution. Not all of these cases result in a prosecution. The
percentage of cases recommended for prosecution, which involved a
fatality or critical injury, is 42 per cent for FY 1985-86, 32 per cent for
1986-87, and 40 per cent for 1987-88. There are no doubt additional
cases where an injury, which was not critical, prompted a
recommendation to prosecute. The experience with criminal sanctions
in other provinces is similar. Between FYx 1983-84 and 1986-87, there
were sixteen prosecutions in Saskatchewan, all but one in response to an
injury or fatality. In Newfoundland, five out of nine prosecutions from
1983 to 1986 involved harm to an employee. Most prosecutions are in
41 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the need for a penalty is least when

serious harm occurs, because a major injury or fatality is itself a sufficient deterrent. However, the
deterrent effect of an injury may be specific rather than general, affecting only the particular
offender and not employers at large. Other employers may be deterred by a penalized employer
whose violation caused an injury even if the penalty is not needed to deter the specific employer.
See T.G. Ison, "The Uses and Limits of Sanctions in Industrial Health and Safety" (1975-76) 2

Workers' Compensation Reporter 203.
42 Ile distinction between risk and actual harm is easy to make in the context of safety
violations posing a risk of injury because an injury can be readily detected. The distinction is much
more difficult to apply to health violations causing a risk of disease because employees who are
adversely affected often do not show any signs of ill health for many years.
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response to harm in other countries. In Britain, 40 per cent of all
prosecutions by the Factory Inspectorate follow upon a fatality or
serious injury. 43 Senior Australian regulators rated the occurrence of
harm as the most important factor in deciding whether to prosecute an
offender. 44
Why does the administrative process punish more offenders for
causing risk, but not harm, than does the criminal process? One
explanation derives from the high costs of prosecuting health and safety
offenders in the courts. This places a severe constraint upon the number
of offenders who can be prosecuted. Only able to afford to prosecute a
tiny minority of offenders, regulatory officials may select for prosecution
those who caused an injury because they are believed to be the most
deserving of punishment. Another explanation focuses upon the role
that judges play in health and safety prosecutions. Where prosecution is
the sanctioning mechanism, health and safety officials are likely to take
their cue from the bench and to concentrate their energies on
prosecuting employers whose offences are most likely to result in a
conviction and a substantial fine. Judges who spend much of their time
dealing with such matters as theft and assault, where actual harm is
readily apparent, may view offences which create only a risk of harm as
being less serious. Whatever the explanation, offenders who create a
risk of harm, which only good fortune prevents from occurring, are more
likely to be punished under a scheme of administrative penalties than in
the courts.
3. Standard of proof
A stricter standard of proof is applied when an employer is
prosecuted for a health and safety offence than when an administrative
penalty is imposed. Before a criminal court will enter a conviction, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the offence charged. The civil standard of proof utilized in

43 K. Hawkins, "Fatcats and Prosecutions in a Regulatory Agency" (1989) 11 Law and
Policy 370 at 380.
44 J. Braithwaite & P. Grabosky, Occupational Health and Safety Enforcement in

Australia: A Report to the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (Canberra:
Australian Institute of Criminology, 1985).
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the administrative process is significantly lower. A penalty will be
confirmed if regulators demonstrate that it is more likely than not that
the employer concerned committed an infraction. As a result of these
differing standards, an offence can be proven more readily in the
administrative process than in the criminal.
While the criminal standard prefers acquitting the guilty to
convicting the innocent, the civil standard views the risk of allowing an
offender to escape punishment as no less troublesome than the risk of
penalizing an innocent party. The criminal standard of proof is
appropriate when the liberty of the accused is at stake. However, this
standard of proof is not warranted in the context of monetary penalties
for health and safety offences because it gives the benefit of any
reasonable doubt to employers' bank accounts rather than to the health
and safety of workers. The civil standard of proof applied in
administrative proceedings is more appropriate because it treats
corporate treasuries as no more worthy of protection than the health
and safety of employees.
C. Cost and Speed
The criminal and administrative processes also differ in their
operating costs and in the speed with which cases are processed.
1. Cost of administrative and criminal penalties
The cost of adjudication is higher in the criminal process because
its procedures are more labour intensive and its staff more highly paid
than those found in the administrative process. Moreover, employers
more often demand full-scale adjudication over a criminal fine than over
an administrative penalty.
One obvious strength of the criminal process is the high degree
of procedural justice accorded to those accused of breaking the law.
While all of the same procedural safeguards could be built into the
administrative process, the unsuitability of some aspects of the criminal
process for regulatory offences has already been demonstrated. The
twin objectives of deterring offences and punishing only deserving
offenders are poorly served by ignoring previous infractions in assessing
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fault and by applying the criminal standard of proof. On the other hand,
several of the procedural safeguards found in the criminal justice system
are equally appropriate in the regulatory context-the presumption of
innocence, an impartial adjudicator, representation by counsel, and a
full-hearing including the cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The
important point is that the administrative process can offer these
protections at a much lower cost than conventional criminal
proceedings.
The court system is very labour intensive. Summonses are served
by hand. Officials appear in court just to set trial dates and the number
of court appearances often multiplies because adjournments are
granted. Even where the accused pleads guilty, this plea has to be
entered with all concerned present in the court room. Regulators often
must educate inexpert prosecutors and judges about the technical
aspects of health and safety law, so that they are sufficiently informed to
make whatever decisions are required.
The administrative process avoids much of this work. Consider,
for example, the procedures followed in British Columbia. Unlike
prosecutors, WCB officials are health and safety specialists who do not
need a crash course in technical matters. Notification of penalty
proceedings is delivered by mail. Dates for meetings and hearings are
arranged through correspondence or over the telephone. The
administrative equivalent of a guilty plea is handled through
correspondence rather than in court. If an employer ignores a show
cause letter, the WCB confirms the proposed penalty and proceeds to
collect it;
The rules of evidence in court proceedings contribute to their
high cost. The criminal standard of proof and the exclusion of evidence
of past offences when assessing fault make it more difficult and more
expensive to secure a conviction in court than to justify an administrative
penalty.
The staff employed in the criminal process is relatively expensive.
Highly paid lawyers play a much larger role in criminal than in
administrative proceedings. The opposite is true for regulatory officials.
In the criminal process, regulators decide whether to recommend a
prosecution, but once charges are laid, the case is carried by lawyers. In
the administrative process, regulators notify an employer of a proposed
penalty and conduct settlement negotiations. Agency lawyers typically
play no role in cases where the employer pays the proposed penalty
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without protest, or in cases settled before a formal contest is launched.
While OSHA solicitors are involved in OSHRC hearings in the United
States, the WCB is not even a party to proceedings before the Appeal
Division in British Columbia.
Not only is the criminal process more costly than its
administrative counterpart, the limited data available suggest that an
employer faced with a criminal prosecution is more likely to mount a fullscale defence than is an employer faced with an administrative penalty.
As a result, costly court trials occur more frequently than do less
expensive administrative proceedings. Of the charges laid in Ontario for
offences alleged to have occurred during the first six months of 1989,
60.1 per cent were met with a plea of not guilty and so proceeded to
trial. 45 Since Bill 208 came into effect, not guilty pleas have become
more common, perhaps because the Bill has resulted in higher fines. Of
the charges laid for offences allegedly occurring between September and
December 1991, just over three-quarters proceeded to trial. 46
Employers in British Columbia and the United States utilize the
full range of administrative procedures available to them less frequently
than Ontario employers insist upon a full-blown trial. Of the
approximately eight hundred British Columbia employers who received
a show cause letter from the wcB in 1990, about one-half requested an
informal meeting with a penalty officer. Informal osHA settlement
conferences occur with about the same frequency. Fewer employers
seek a formal hearing, especially in the United States. Of the penalties
confirmed by the wcB's Occupational Health and Safety Division in
1990, only 45 per cent were appealed to the Appeal Division and most of
the employers filing appeals did not request an oral hearing. In the
United States, less than 20 per cent of osHA inspections with penalized
violations are the subject of a formal contest before the osHRC.
Approximately 90 per cent of these contested cases are settled or
withdrawn without a hearing.
One possible explanation for a lower contest rate in the United
States than in British Columbia is that OSHA penalties are typically
smaller than WCB penalties. As monetary penalties in British Columbia
and Ontario differ little in size, this factor does not explain the different
rates of contest in these two jurisdictions. The most likely explanation is
45 Charges that were withdrawn or stayed are not included in this analysis.
46 This analysis includes only those cases resolved by 7 February 1992.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 No. 3

that more offenders contest criminal penalties than administrative
sanctions. A study of the use of administrative and criminal penalties for
Commission in the
securities violations by the Securities and Exchange
47
conclusion.
same
the
to
came
States
United
If employers are more prone to contest criminal fines than
administrative penalties, why might this be? One explanation may be
that criminal fines carry a greater stigma. A more subtle explanation
may be that the criminal process promotes contest by not deciding
whether a penalty is warranted, or how large the penalty will be, until
after a full-scale trial in which the accused employer is invited to
participate. In the administrative process, both of these decisions are
made by the front-line enforcement agency at an early stage, before the
employer decides whether to contest the matter. Only if the employer
refuses to accept these decisions does the matter proceed to
adjudication before a second agency. Perhaps employers are more likely
to admit having engaged in wrongdoing when faced with a preliminary
decision to that effect. Perhaps they are more inclined not to protest
their innocence when they know in advance the financial consequences
of not protesting. Whatever the explanation, higher contest rates in the
criminal process require more resources to be devoted to investigating
and adjudicating cases.
Costly court procedures combined with the propensity of
employers to make greater use of the criminal process render the court
system much more expensive than its administrative counterpart. Some
measure of the resource implications can be gleaned by comparing the
Ontario Ministry of Labour staff involved in prosecutions with the wca
staff involved in penalty proceedings. In F' 1989-90, fourteen lawyers
employed by. the Legal Services Branch of the Ontario Ministry of
Labour devoted about 70 per cent of their time to approximately five
hundred health and safety prosecutions. In stark contrast, three WCB
sanction review officers handled over eight hundred British Columbia
penalty proceedings in 1990. Moreover, the number of hours devoted to
prosecutions by Ontario inspectors and judges far exceeds the time spent
by their British Columbia counterparts on administrative proceedings.
The burden of legal costs for taxpayers is a drawback of the criminal
process, but not the major one. A more important shortcoming of
47 S. Shapiro, "The Road Not Taken: The Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for
White-Collar Offenders" (1985) 19 L & Soc. Rev. 179 at 206.
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criminal proceedings is that the high cost is a huge disincentive to
penalizing offenders.
2. Delay in the administrative and criminal process
The administrative process functions much faster than the
judicial process. Speed is important because the field officer who
recommends a sanction and the accused firm are cast in the role of
adversaries while enforcement proceedings are pending. A cooperative
relationship is not likely to be restored until these proceedings run their
course.

In Ontario, the average delay between the occurrence of a
violation and the laying of charges was approximately 250 days in FY
1989-90 and F' 1990-91. The average time lapse between the occurrence
of a violation and the entering of a verdict at trial was approximately 500
days. Appeals consume additional time.
In British Columbia, show cause letters are issued about twenty
days after the occurrence of the violation, which prompted the penalty
recommendation. When the employer elects to respond with a written
submission, a decision whether to confirm a penalty is usually made
within sixty-five to seventy days of the occurrence. 48 When the employer
requests a meeting, proceedings often take about twice as long because
of the difficulty of finding a date when all concerned are available to
meet. The Appeal Division is obliged by statute to render a decision
within ninety days of the commencement of an appeal except where the
Chief Appeal Commissioner determines that certain statutory
exceptions apply.49
Over the last decade at OSHA, the average time lapse between
inspection and penalty citation has varied from a low of 17 days in 198182 to a high of 30 days in 1990-91. In 1985-86, the only year for which
OHSRC data are available, the average time lapse from assignment of a
case to an administrative law judge until disposition was 171 days for

48

The show cause letter fixes a deadline of twenty-one days for the employer to make

submissions and the employer is allowed the same time to reply to anything new arising out of the
initiating officer's comments about the employer's submissions.
49

Workers' CompensationAct, s. 91(3).
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settled cases and 307 days for cases which were adjudicated. Additional
time was required for cases referred to the commissioners.
D. Why RegulatorsPreferAdministrative Penalties
A comparison of administrative penalties in British Columbia
and the United States with prosecution in Ontario and other provinces
strongly suggests more offenders are penalized under an administrative
system. The study of the Securities and Exchange Commission
mentioned above reached the same conclusion.5 0 The Commission was
more likely to initiate penalty proceedings when administrative sanctions
were available than when the only sanction was prosecution for a
regulatory offence. One virtue of this study is that it compared the use
of these two enforcement mechanisms by a single agency, thereby
eliminating any differences caused by the characteristics of the agency.
Why do regulators make greater use of administrative penalties
than of criminal sanctions? Several reasons have been suggested in the
literature. The one most often cited is the high cost of criminal
proceedings5 1 Enforcement agencies simply cannot afford to prosecute
as frequently as they can afford to levy administrative penalties.
Regulators must allocate fixed resources between more prosecutions
and other means of achieving compliance, such as more inspections.
The opportunity cost of a prosecution, in terms of inspections foregone,
is much higher than the opportunity cost of an administrative
proceeding.
As well as consuming vast amounts of agency resources, court
proceedings entail personal costs for inspectors. A dislike of doing the
paper work required for prosecutions or of being cross-examined in
court may lead field officers, the gatekeepers of the enforcement
process, not to recommend prosecutions in the first place 5 2 The

50 Shapiro, supranote 47 at 192.
51 Administrative Conference, Recommendation 72-6, (1972) 2 Recommendations and
Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States 896; Ison, supra note 37; J.
Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: The Enforcement of Coal Mine Legislation (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1985); Shapiro, ibid.
52

Hawkins, supra note 27 at 199.
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administrative process is less burdensome for inspectors because it is
more streamlined and has a lower contest rate.
Another factor contributing to regulators' reluctance to
prosecute offenders is the difficulty of securing a conviction. Regulatory
officials are reluctant to take penalty action unless there is a high chance
of success;s 3 The criminal standard of proof and the exclusion of
evidence of prior offences when assessing fault make it more difficult to
secure a criminal conviction than to justify an administrative penalty.
The longer delays of the criminal process also make prosecution less
attractive than administrative sanctions.
Regulators' perception of the stigma associated with criminal
proceedings may add to their reluctance to prosecute 5 4 Regulatory
officials may believe court fines to be more stigmatizing than
administrative penalties. If they do, they are likely to view
administrative sanctions as appropriate for offenders who deserve
punishment but are thought not to warrant the stigma of a criminal
penalty.
IV. CONCLUSION
The relative merits of administrative and criminal penalties can
be briefly summarized. The administrative process is faster and less
expensive. Offenders who warrant punishment are more likely to be
identified in the administrative process because it takes account of
previous offences in assessing fault, punishes offenders for causing risk
not just harm, and applies the civil standard of proof. The
administrative process has the potential to generate more penalties and
thereby to give employers a greater incentive to comply with regulatory
requirements. This potential will be realized so long as health and safety
regulators adopt an aggressive enforcement policy. Where the criminal
process is utilized, regulators who wish to embark upon a stringent
enforcement campaign are constrained by the high cost of the criminal
process and by the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings. These
advantages of administrative penalties present a strong case for making

53 ]bid. at 186.
54 Administrative Conference, supra note 51.
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greater use of them, as has been advocated in the United States by the
Administrative Conference. 55
While the administrative process has several attractions, the
criminal process may have one redeeming virtue. Criminal sanctions
may be more stigmatizing than administrative penalties, although there
is little empirical evidence on this point. The possibly greater stigma of
criminal penalties may enhance their ability to deter offenders and
eventually may lead more employers to comply with health and safety
legislation because compliance is viewed as morally correct.
Unfortunately, the possibly greater stigma of criminal penalties may
deter regulators from prosecuting some offenders who should be
penalized.
In occupational health and safety regulation, there is a hybrid of
the criminal and administrative types of sanctions. Under a hybrid
scheme, regulators have the power to assess a penalty, but if the
employer protests, the matter is ultimately adjudicated by a court rather
than a second administrative agency.5 6 Hybrid penalties are plagued by
the major weaknesses of both the administrative and criminal processes.
Contested cages proceed to court with all of the attendant drawbacks.
Even for uncontested cases, it would be wrong to assume that a hybrid
scheme avoids the disadvantages of the criminal process. While the first
stage of a hybrid procedure has the trappings of the administrative
process, it operates in the shadow of the courts and is strongly
influenced by them. Regulators are reluctant to propose a hybrid
penalty, which does not have a high chance of being confirmed by a
judge if disputed in court. As most cases are resolved without judicial
intervention under a hybrid scheme, most fines entail no more stigma
than an administrative penalty.
This is not to suggest that hybrid schemes have none of the
advantages of either administrative or criminal penalties. Uncontested
cases are handled in a summary fashion, which is less cumbersome than
court proceedings. Convictions in contested cases carry whatever stigma

55b&
56 One example of the hybrid approach is the ticketing scheme used in Ontario by the
Construction Health and Safety Branch to deal primarily with offences by employees. Another
example is found in Quebec where the Commission de la Sant6 et de ]a S6curit6 du Travail issues a
notice of violation for certain types of infractions whether committed by employees or employers.
The person receiving such a notice can avoid appearing in court by paying the fine specified therein.
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goes with the judicial process. Nonetheless, a hybrid scheme is seriously
flawed.
A dual system of administrative and criminal penalties has much
more to recommend. Administrative penalties could be utilized for the
vast majority of regulatory infractions, and criminal prosecution held in
reserve for the most serious offences. The low cost of the administrative
process would permit deserving offenders to be penalized with sufficient
frequency to provide a large financial deterrent to violating regulatory
standards. The occasional high profile prosecution would enhance
employers' perception of the stigma they risk incurring if the law is not
is one example of the "enforcement
obeyed. This sort of dual system
57
elsewhere.
pyramid" advocated
Establishing a dual system of penalties is easier said than done.
When regulators have been allowed to choose between administrative
proceedings and prosecution, administrative penalties have been utilized
almost to the total exclusion of criminal sanctions. There was not a
single prosecution in British Columbia between 1986 and 1990 even
though the wcB is empowered to prosecute offenders;58 In the United
States, an employer may be prosecuted for a health and safety violation
only if it is committed "wilfully" and causes death.59 During the first
eighteen years of OSHA's existence, 1970 to 1988, only forty-two cases
were referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution and only
fourteen prosecutions were initiated. The obvious inference is that OSHA
uses administrative penalties much more often than criminal sanctions
even for wilful violations causing death. The challenge in designing a
dual system of penalties is to ensure that the criminal option is used with
sufficient frequency to make it a real threat, even though most penalties
are of the administrative variety. This could be accomplished by
defining a category of serious offences for which the only available
enforcement route is the criminal one, leaving the administrative avenue
open for less serious violations.
A dual system of penalties offers the best of both administrative
and criminal sanctions. It holds great promise for occupational health
and safety and other types of social regulation.

57 Braithwaite, supra note 51 at 142-147.
58

Workers' CompensationAct, s. 75.

59 OccupationalSafety and HealthAct, § 17(e).

